



Starting point...

Nuclear terrorism = topic of popular, academic and political concern



BUT: Difficult to assess the threat

Complicating matters even more...

Traditional threat assessments primarily focus on three issues

- Motivation terrorist organizations
- Availability of nuclear/radiological technology and know-how
- Availability of nuclear/radiological material

YET: focus on organizational issues underdeveloped

Research design

No empirical cases



Build on the organizational commonality between four selected cases and a “most-likely” terrorism project



Four cases with an analogous *nonroutine* nature of technology



Los Alamos

South Africa’s development of nuclear devices

Aum Shinrikyo’s chemical and biological armament activities

Al Qaeda’s implementation of 9/11

Provisional results (1)

Four intertwined organizational challenges

- Resource support
- Operational autonomy
- Information-sharing
- Clear and compelling goals

Provisional results (2)

Common thread? Importance of the organizational design



Professional design will increase likelihood of effectively completing a nuclear terrorism plot

Provisional results (3)

BUT: *Technology* is not the only contingency



Professional design is a hard fit with operational and organizational security



No efficient strategy for terrorist organizations



Effectiveness – efficiency trade-off

Conclusion

Organizational approach to the threat of nuclear terrorism emphasizes particular issues that are often neglected in threat assessments.

-> Highlights an inherent effectiveness-efficiency trade-off

Q & A
