

# ANCCLI : a national network to discuss about Transparency and nuclear safety



Transparence  
Information  
Echange

**anccli**  
LA SÛRETÉ NUCLÉAIRE PARLONS-EN !

# ANCCLI : a national network to discuss about Transparency and nuclear safety

## A model for civil society engagement in governance of ionizing radiation risks: ANCCLI changes the game in French nuclear accident preparedness



***Jean-Claude DELALONDE, President,  
ANCCLI***

*(Presented by Claire Mays, Symlog – prepared on the  
basis of 3 existing presentations, and press articles)*

# Outline

- What is ANCCLI? What do we want to do? Why is it needed?
- An example of civil society engagement in governance: **Our investigation of Nuclear Accident Preparedness in France**
- The themes, topics, content which were picked up by the press following our press conference in April 2016
- The effect on political decision
- But what about actual implementation?
- Conclusions

# ANCCLI and CLIs are neutral stakeholders

## The long road to promote and enhance the role of civil society

1977 first **LOCAL INFORMATION COMMISSION =CLI**  
created at Fessenheim NPP

1981 : Prime Minister creates CLIs for all NPPs & some other installations

2006 : Transparency and Nuclear Safety TSN Act gives CLIs legal basis – under supervision of elected Departmental Councils which are not directly involved in nuclear safety control =>Nuclear Safety Authority **ASN** prerogative

2000: **ANCCLI** is founded as national representation of CLIs

2015 : Energy Transition Act adds new missions for CLIs (public meetings, consultation on emergency plan updates...)

# Local Information Commission (CLI)

Before : Relaying official information



## Iter : plus de 3 000 personnes à loger à proximité du chantier

La Commission locale d'information organise une réunion publique vendredi à Vinon

**U**n camping abusivement à Vinon, dans le département de la Haute-Loire, a été déclaré d'utilité publique. Les habitants de la commune ont été informés de la situation par la Commission locale d'information (CLI) qui a organisé une réunion publique vendredi à Vinon. La CLI a été créée par la loi relative à l'accès à l'information (loi n° 178 du 17 janvier 1978) et a pour mission de relayer l'information officielle et de permettre aux citoyens de s'exprimer sur les projets de loi et de décret. La CLI a été créée par la loi relative à l'accès à l'information (loi n° 178 du 17 janvier 1978) et a pour mission de relayer l'information officielle et de permettre aux citoyens de s'exprimer sur les projets de loi et de décret.

**Entre 800 et 1200 personnes sont attendues dès l'année prochaine**

Le camping abusivement à Vinon, dans le département de la Haute-Loire, a été déclaré d'utilité publique. Les habitants de la commune ont été informés de la situation par la Commission locale d'information (CLI) qui a organisé une réunion publique vendredi à Vinon. La CLI a été créée par la loi relative à l'accès à l'information (loi n° 178 du 17 janvier 1978) et a pour mission de relayer l'information officielle et de permettre aux citoyens de s'exprimer sur les projets de loi et de décret.

Now: Developing its own expertise to be **involved and influential** in decision processes

**Purview:** Radiological protection, nuclear safety, impacts on persons and environment


Ability to engage epidemiological studies, environmental analyses...

Transparence  
Information  
Echange

anccli  
LA SOCIÉTÉ NUCLEAIRE PARLONS EN !

# 35 Local Information Commissions (CLI)

Represent a diversity of contexts and experiences



*ASN, other State bodies and operators have access to the work done by the CLI*

# CLIs want to be autonomous actors

*For the CLIs, communication is not only delivering information, they need to:*

- Exchange
- Discuss
- Share diversity of opinion
- Develop their own understanding
- Develop their knowledge in many areas





# ANCCLI as national representation

*'sharing technical aspects, inspiring reflection, supporting development of citizen expertise'*

## Activities in 2015

- Participation in territorial CLI meetings
- 50 internal meetings
- 80 meetings with national & international partners (ministries, parliament, high committee on transparency and safety, authorities, European Commission....)
- Weighing in on regulatory and legal context
- Engaging studies and expertise



Preparing 3 White Papers as contribution to national debate



Technical Dialogues  
Ongoing series in partnership with IRSN



Newsletters



Working Groups

Transparence  
Information  
Echange





# Civil society : 4<sup>th</sup> pillar of nuclear safety ?



1. Operator
2. Regulator
3. Technical support organization = Public expert
4. Civil society

# IFOP Survey : 'In case of nuclear accident, what is the proper safety distance to be observed to protect the population?'


Majority of French people surveyed in 2014 answer :  
*'More than 300 km'*

➤ Note that each French resident lives today within 200 km of an NPP.

➤ 25 Million live within 80 km (the area affected by FKS)

➤ France has the largest nuclear fleet in Europe = 19 NPPs = 58 reactors

➤ In all, 126 basic nuclear installations





A recent example of our  
civil society engagement in governance

# Nuclear Safety : What is the price to be paid?

***Study and evaluation of France's  
territorial nuclear emergency  
preparedness and response plans***

Press Conference  
Paris, 5 april 2016

*ANCCLI's press conference asked:*

**‘30 years after Chernobyl  
5 years after Fukushima:**

**What lessons have been learned  
from these two catastrophes?’**

*(a selection of press conference content follows in  
this presentation)*

# The price of these 2 catastrophes

Chernobyl



23% of Belarussian territory contaminated by Cesium137

Fukushima




In 2016, 80 000 inhabitants are still refugees

***Measured by ANCCLI in € ? No... in terms of  
Contamination of a homeland ...  
Social disruption for displaced persons and families***


# In France, 58 reactors aged from 15 to 39 years

## L'ÂGE DES CENTRALES DU PARC NUCLÉAIRE FRANÇAIS




# In France, 7 sites on national borders

## LES SITES NUCLÉAIRES FRONTALIERS







In 2016, Nuclear Safety Authority  
**ASN** and the other nuclear actors  
all agree :

A large-scale nuclear  
accident is possible in  
France


In order to formulate precise and quantified recommendations on the implementation of

## Nuclear accident emergency measures

# ANCCLI

in accordance with its missions ordered 2 audits: by its **Scientific Committee** and an independent expert laboratory, **ACRO**

# Two reports delivered eloquent results, highlighting contradictions: *France is not ready*



# Defense in depth – the ‘outer layer’ being the emergency and territorial response plans



Source : IRSN

## Protective measures to ‘limit impact’ on populations

- Sheltering
- Absorbing stable iodine
- Evacuation
- Radiological control of foodstuffs

# Principles of protection

**‘On paper, everything seems to be in place. In reality, much is missing.’**



*This slide and following: In purple = Most ‘quoted’ or referenced contents found in news publications & broadcasts resulting from the ANCCLI press conference.*  
Nationally: ~25 the day after the press conference – more followed


*‘It’s as if everything has been worked out to a strict minimum, reducing the measures and their effects to the smallest radius, even omitting some, putting us behind other nuclear countries’*

# Extend the preparedness zones

- Today, evacuation is foreseen to a 5km radius; stable iodine distribution and sheltering to 10km
- On the basis of population analysis and Fukushima experience, ANCCLI, conurbations of Bordeaux, Cherbourg-Octeville: reset to 80 km
- AtHLET study 2014: Be ready to shelter and distribute iodine to 100km
- **TODAY IN BELGIUM: 20km**
- **TODAY in SWITZERLAND: 50km**


# Cherbourg Arsenal (military site)

*example of how 5-km zoning leaves out essential community features*





# Specific intervention plans should be adjusted to population basins



*Number of persons  
residing within:*

75 km

30 km

10 km

# *Le Temps – Swiss daily*

*Interpreting the numbers on the preceding slide,  
This newspaper was the only one to cite this  
observation:*

*‘Consequences of an accident like Chernobyl or  
Fukushima could be worse in France’*

# Evacuation

- Foreseen to just 5 km radius (*AtHLET: recommend up to 20 km*)
- Capacity to shelter refugees unknown
  - In INDIA, shelters identified, number of beds, blankets, saris needed counted, food needs identified
- Never an estimation of evacuation times nor simulation
  - Obligatory in USA, Canada, Japan
  - No accounting for spontaneous evacuation
  - TMI: evacuation was recommended for 3500 persons, but 200,000 were evacuated in fact.
- Particular issue of vulnerable persons (elderly, hospitalized)
  - > **Need for robust planning with scientific evaluation**

# What has changed in France since Fukushima?

- One study of severe accident consequences
- January 2014: revision of national plan but...
- State prefects **have not yet** revised and adjusted the local intervention plans.
  - Existing plans are full of anachronisms, ignore the advent of Internet...
- ***Compare to substantial and prudent revisions in neighboring countries***
  - *France's measures are now in contradiction with those that would be applied across borders... No harmonization nor communication foreseen*

# Stakeholder involvement


- France : Certain preparedness/intervention plans have never been made public nor discussed with residents (*despite ICRP recommendation*)

***‘It’s time to get to work, in concert with civil society. Things won’t change by magic.’***

***‘We want to make proposals, and if they are not retained, we want to know why’.***

# Conclusions – *Constructive criticism, not catatrophism*

- Extend the measures foreseen, *based on a comparison with European, Japanese, American, Canadian, Indian experience*
- Put the accent on protecting vulnerable populations
- Perform scientific evaluation of the specific plans and discuss them with stakeholders
- **Discuss long term consequences with populations and give them the choice**



ANCCLI's recommendations for  
emergency measures:  
In the Press Packet, and

In a White Paper on Post-  
Accident Management

To appear mid-2016



# An outcome on the *political* level

On 26 April 2016 (30th anniversary of Chernobyl), Ecology Minister S. Royal announced the extension of the intervention zone to a 20km radius around NPPs

- This will multiply considerably the populations involved.
- ANCCLI emphasizes that European nuclear safety authorities, including ASN, unanimously say that zones should extend to 100 km.

# But what about the *administrative* level?

The 26 April decision to extend the intervention zone to 20km was taken jointly by Ecology and Prime Ministers.

- *But the Ecology cabinet emphasized that the PM's General Secretariat of Defense and National Security is responsible for implementation.*
- ANCCLI (*interview, Journal de l'Environnement*):  
'We have been waiting 22 months now for the Ministry of the Interior to get the state prefects to adjust the specific plans...
- 'The prefects haven't done their work, it's a bit shocking'
- 'We hope the high civil servants will listen to the political decision makers.'

# ANCCLI changed the game in France this year

Exercising our mission as the 4th pillar of nuclear safety,

**A competent, autonomous representation of  
Civil Society**

**Raising our voice to the national press,**

We contributed to a measureable change in the political  
deciders' view on and planning of Nuclear Safety in France

*However, the actual implementation is still up in the air...*

*We still have not moved the administrative deciders.*

Nonetheless we are convinced that our model of action  
can be studied and adopted by Civil Society in other  
contexts, adding to nuclear safety in Europe as a whole

# Thanks for your attention



[www.anccli.fr](http://www.anccli.fr)



@anccli

[yveslheureux@me.com](mailto:yveslheureux@me.com)

Transparence  
Information  
Echange

